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ABSTRACT 
 
We provide new evidence on the impact of ownership over firm performance, using a 
panel data of 853 corporate firms from 9 Continental European countries from 2000 to 
2004. We confirm that owner-manager is significantly better performer than 
professional manager, due to the convergence effect. Moreover, this impact was found 
to be much more significant than ownership, whose link with performance could not be 
established. Additionally, ownership structure is not an endogenous variable as it does 
not vary in order to maximize the firm’s performance, remaining relatively stable over 
time. Finally, we find evidence of several country and industry effects.  
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RESUMO 
 
Este trabalho apresenta novos resultados acerca do impacto da estrutura de propriedade 
na performance da empresa, utilizando uma amostra de 853 empresas de 9 países da 
Europa Continental do ano 2000 até ao ano 2004. Neste contexto observou-se que o 
proprietário-gestor da empresa apresenta um melhor desempenho que o gestor 
profissional devido ao efeito de controlo. Este impacto é bastante mais significativo que 
a estrutura de propriedade cuja relação com performance não foi encontrada. 
Adicionalmente concluímos que a estrutura de propriedade não é uma variável 
endógena, uma vez que não varia no sentido de maximizar a performance da empresa, 
mas mantém-se relativamente estável ao longo do tempo. Por fim, confirmamos 
diferenças entre países e sectores. 
 
 
Palavras Chave: Propriedade de Empresas, Governação de empresas, Performance da 
Empresas, Europa. 
Classificação JEL: G32, G34 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
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This work analyzes the influence of ownership on performance. We study whether 
differences in corporate governance across countries and industries can explain 
differences in performance. Observing ownership data from 853 Continental European 
corporate firms from Portugal, Spain, France, Germany, Belgium, Italy, Greece, Austria 
and Finland, over the period between 2000 and 2004, we aim at shedding light on the 
following questions: 
 
 How does insider ownership influence performance? 
 Which impact does ownership structure have on performance? Can ownership 
mitigate agency problems? 
 
Several studies have been carried out to measure the impact of insider ownership and 
ownership concentration on firm performance, but these relationships remain 
unexplored in many contexts and nations. This study contributes to the empirical 
literature by providing new evidence from a wide variety of European companies, 
explaining the cross-sectional variation in results across countries and industries. 
Furthermore we expect that our findings help shareholders’ choices on capital flotation 
and decisions about whether to sustain the firm’s management or to contract a 
professional-manager. 
 
The type of ownership structure and level of separation of ownership and control can 
affect the firm’s performance by solving agency conflicts between majority and 
minority shareholders and between managers and shareholders. The classical problem 
of corporate governance is the “principal-agent” conflict, which emerges from the 
separation between ownership and control. The firm’s owner can hire a professional to 
manage the firm instead of retaining the firms’ control by himself. However the 
manager can take decisions which diverge from the shareholders’ interests. To mitigate 
this problem, the manager may be compensated with some of the firm’s shares to align 
his interests with those of shareholders, with a potentially positive impact on the firm’s 
performance (Berle and Means, 1932; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Demsetz, 1983). 
More recently, researchers analyzed another type of agency problems: the conflict of 
interests between minority and large shareholders. Minority’ shareholders have limited 
voting rights precluding their capacity to effectively influence decision making, while 
majority shareholders have the power to act as the firm’s real owner. Consequently we 
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can distinguish two main types of ownership structure: concentrated and dispersed 
ownership. Dispersed ownership can induce managers to adopt a free-riding behavior, 
however it can lead to gains in risk diversification and in higher market and job 
knowledge. On the other hand, concentrated ownership solves the conflict between 
shareholders and managers since control is either maintained by the major shareholder 
or he highly monitors the manager, which can improve the firm’s performance. 
However, as the dominant shareholder shares ownership with minority investors, he can 
define the firm’s strategy attending to his self-interests rather than a value maximizing 
approach, leading to the expropriation of minorities and a decline in performance (Hart, 
1995; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). In conclusion, we can say that both managerial 
ownership and ownership concentration can influence the performance because both 
variables appear to influence the firm’s investment, strategy and growth opportunities.  
 
The relationship between the performance and either insider ownership or ownership 
concentration were widely explored in the modern literature. The majority of the 
researchers focused their study in the U.S. (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; McConnel and 
Servaes, 1990; Mehran, 1995; Cui and Mak, 2002), and the U.K. (Leech and Leahy, 
1991; Mudambi and Nicosia, 1998). Only a few have ventured elsewhere: Finland 
(Eisenberg et al., 1998), Japan (Morck et al., 2000; Gedajlovic and Shapiro, 2002) and 
Spain (Miguel et al., 2004). Finally, comparative studies are still at their infancy: 
Gedajilovic and Shapiro (1998), analyzed 5 countries: Canada, the U.S., the U.K., 
Germany and France; Thomsen and Pedersen (2000), analyzed 12 European countries: 
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Spain and Sweden; and Claessens et al. (2002) and Lemmon and 
Lins (2003) analyzed 8 East Asia countries: Hong Kong, Indonesia, South Korea, 
Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand. We extend the previous 
studies to 9 European countries, some of them already explored by Thomsen and 
Pedersen (2000) - Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, and Spain - 
whereas Greece and Portugal have not been examined in prior studies.  
 
Firm performance, measured by market (Tobin’s Q) and accounting (ROA) measures is 
regressed among both managerial ownership and ownership concentration in the three 
major shareholders. Using the OLS regression we test each equation individually, 
controlling some other variables that may also influence performance. Then we use a 
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simultaneous equation to test for the endogeneity of ownership variables and to ensure 
the robustness of our results.  
 
We find evidence of a linear relationship between insider ownership and performance, 
confirming the alignment effect. Therefore, managers may take decisions that lead to 
the firm’s performance maximization and so, as they acquire the company shares, the 
interests of both the managers and shareholders are aligned. Moreover, owner-manager 
is concerned with the firm’s long term survival and reputation, which leads to an 
increase in the performance, while a professional manager is expensive according to the 
relationship benefits (gained from his market and professional knowledge) and costs 
(from the salary and non-productive investments). 
  
Regarding the influence of ownership structure on the firm performance, we do not find 
evidence of the monitoring and expropriation effect as some researchers did (including 
Gedajlovic and Shapiro, 1998, Thomsen and Pedersen, 2000, Anderson and Reeb, 2003 
and Miguel et al., 2004). Therefore, our findings do not confirm that concentrated 
ownership leads to better performance than dispersed ownership. Hence, investors 
choose the ownership structure that maximizes their own strategy and interests, and do 
no change it to maximize the performance, due to problems of coordination and 
communication. 
 
Our analysis focused on firms from 9 Continental European countries, with different 
corporate governance. The results confirm significant differences among countries. 
Each nation has specific institutional characteristics, macroeconomic instability, and 
investors’ legal protection, which influences the type of ownership structure and the 
agency conflicts (Thomsen and Perdersen, 2000). The firms included in the study also 
belong to different industries and we found that firms from the same industry appear to 
have similar influences. Specifically firms of the same industry suffer from the same 
competition, financial pressure, growth opportunities and other factors that influence 
performance (Nickel et al., 1997; Gedajlovic and Shapiro, 1998). 
 
To conclude the study we addressed the endogeneity problem to confirm the robustness 
of the results. Contrary to Demsetz and Lehn (1985), Himmelberg et al. (1999) and 
Demsetz and Villalonga (2001), we do not find the ownership to be an endogenous 
18 
variable. Likewise, our results are robust, since the ownership structure does not depend 
on firm performance but remains stable over time. 
 
Our study is structured as follows: in section 2 we present the theoretical background; 
then, in section 3, we introduce the theory, the hypotheses created and the model 
developed; in section 4 we describe the data and methodology; the results are shown in 
section 5; the results’ discussion is provided in section 6, and finally the summary, 
conclusions and paths for future research are presented in section 7. 
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2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
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 “A firm, therefore, consists of the system of relationship which comes into existence 
when the direction of resources is dependent on an entrepreneur” (Coase, 1937:393). 
 
As Coase (1937) referred in his seminal study, to be present in the market, a firm needs 
an entrepreneur. The entrepreneur or owner is the responsible for the firm’s creation, 
management and survival. In order to do this the owner does not work alone, but rather 
establishes contractual relations with other investors, employees, suppliers, customers, 
creditors, and so on. These contractual relationships characterize each firm and are 
differentiators of the firm in relation to competitors. To manage the firm, the owner can 
hire a professional manager or can retain the control by himself. Maintaining the firm’s 
control has private benefits, with the production of value to the shareholder. However it 
also generates costs because the shareholder has to acquire information about the 
manager’s effort to produce output. In such case, the firm’s owner is its manager and 
the private benefits obtained from the control maintenance are higher than the costs 
inherent to it (Dyck and Zingales, 2004). Conversely, there are several typical situations 
where the firm’s owner does not sustain its control but is forced to establish a 
contractual relation with a specialist. For example, the owner can possess shares from 
several companies and he does not have time enough to control all firms. In one other 
situation, the owner can have poor knowledge and know-how about the market and the 
job. It is also normal to contract a professional in the case of multiple shareholders due 
to, for one hand, the difficulty to choose one owner to assume the firm’s control and, on 
the other hand, the infeasibility to have many managers as it can lead to problems in 
communication and coordination. This separation of ownership and control is 
established by a contract between the manager and the shareholder which Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) define as “agency relationship”; The shareholder who acts as principal 
hires a person (the agent) to control the firm and, to increase his performance, the agent 
receives a pecuniary salary and some other amenities for doing that job (Demsetz, 
1983). With this contract, in which the parties define each other’s rights and obligations, 
their protection and the accomplishment of their goals are guaranteed. Regarding this 
contract it is difficult and expensive for shareholders to anticipate all future situations, 
to define how to deal with them, or to establish it in a legal form. Consequently, the 
contracts are incomplete, have gaps, and neglect some eventualities (Coase, 1937; Hart, 
1995; Gomez-Mejia and Nuñez-Nickel, 2001). Moreover, managers can act differently 
from shareholder’s interests, without complying the contract. They can perform 
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opportunistically and use their power to satisfy their self-interest, especially in the 
absence of appropriate incentives or sufficient supervision (Amihud and Lev, 1999; 
Lane et al., 1999). Being a rational economic agent, the risks he faces for controlling the 
firm are not fully compensated, so he has the incentive to search for additional 
compensation through non compensatory means. This divergence of interests leads to 
what Jensen and Meckling (1976) called “agency costs”. Additionally, managers are 
better informed than the firm’s owner about the company’s potential. This information 
asymmetry occurs because managers are responsible for the firm’s growth and 
sustainability, and consequently they can take decisions which are more convenient to 
them, leading to the need of the firm’s owner to pay to control managers (Demirgüç-
Kunt and Maksimovic, 1998). The problem increases when the firm has higher free cash 
flow and poor project opportunities to invest in, since managers have few future cash 
obligations to accomplish, and so they can maintain diversification strategies and select 
projects that do not add value to the firm (Berle and Means, 1937; Bajaj et al., 1998; 
Denis et al., 1999). In order to minimize the managers’ propensity to act 
opportunistically (the free-rider problem), shareholders need to create incentives, 
control and monitor managers.  
 
“Control is defined as the power to exercise discretion over major decision making, 
including specifically the choice of directors.” (Leech and Leahy, 1991: 1418). There 
are diverse internal and external formal mechanisms of control that owners can use to 
align managers’ interests with their own ones (Gomez-Mejia, 1992; Schulze, et al 
2003). One way is to finance the firm with debt because if managers do not perform 
efficiently they loose their job and consequently their reputation in the market. In this 
case, they are obliged to pay future cash flow to the creditors (Nickel et al., 1997). 
Moreover, senior and secured creditors can participate in the firm’s decisions and 
evaluate and analyze the firm’s performance. However, increasing debt leads to higher 
costs to the firm (bankruptcy costs) which may have problems in solving their payments 
to banks (Jensen, 1986). As the level of debt increases, the firm’s equity becomes less 
representative, the risk to concede loans to this firm gets higher, making banks more 
reluctant to lend capital to the firm. Hence, the financial structure of the firm influences 
its investments’ decisions, strategy and future performance (Aghion and Bolton, 1989; 
Titman and Wessels, 1988). Another way to align managers’ interests with those of 
shareholders is through the market place for managers. If replacing managers is an easy 
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task, managers have an incentive to ensure the maximization of the firm performance to 
maintain their job (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Nickel et al., 
1997). Nevertheless, managers can either try to make themselves indispensable to the 
firm or increase debt, in order to reduce the discipline of the market for corporate 
control (Stulz, 1988; Jensen, 1983). Takeovers can also be used to align the interests of 
managers and shareholders (Jensen and Ruback, 1983; Morck et al., 1989). When the 
board of directors is unable or unwilling to control the managers’ decisions and the firm 
performs poorly by comparison with its competitors, the board can remove managers 
through takeovers that increase the firms’ internal control (Morck et al., 1989). In this 
case, the manager’s ability to over-expand and over-invest is reduced, increasing the 
firm’s efficiency (Bethel and Liebeskind, 1993). However, managers are likely to 
oppose takeovers even if shareholders can benefit from them, because inherent to 
takeovers are replacements of managers, and loss of prestige. Besides, it is difficult to 
distinguish between managerial incompetence, managerial opportunism or mere bad 
luck, and therefore the solution to increase performance can be unrelated with 
manager’s substitution. Additionally, takeovers are perceived as a mechanism which 
provides economies of scale or synergies, increasing the firm’s value. Conversely, 
Jensen (1986) finds that takeovers are expensive and can destroy rather than create 
value to the firm, because the adaptation to the new firm’s environment can be hard to 
achieve. Finally, a common way to align managers' interests with those of shareholders 
is to induce managers to acquire company shares (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). As the 
fraction of shares detained by managers’ increases, they loose the incentive to consume 
perquisites, preferring to maximize the firm performance. In this way managers increase 
their wealth and a result of a good job done is that agency costs are reduced (Agrawal 
and Knoeber, 1996). 
Agency costs are not exclusive to the relation between managers and shareholders. They 
may also emerge between majority and minority shareholders. The firm can be detained 
by various investors and each investor has a different percentage of the firm’s shares. 
Likewise, there are some investors, namely the major shareholders, who detain the 
firm’s control and, therefore, are responsible for major decisions. Such investors can try 
to maximize their wealth through incorrect strategies, leading to the value expropriation 
of the small investors (Hart, 1995; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Consequently, only if 
investors are protected by law, they will decide to acquire part of the firm, otherwise 
they prefer to detain the firm’s control or to invest in other companies to avoid losing 
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money. Minorities can also collect information and participate actively in the firm’s 
decisions to control the dominant shareholders’ decisions and strategies. In conclusion, 
we can affirm that diffused ownership leads, most of the times, to the separation of 
ownership and control and, inherently, to agency conflicts between managers and 
shareholders. By contrast, concentrated ownership leads to problems between major 
shareholders and minority investors. Therefore, there is not a consensual optimal 
structure, rather resulting from the equilibrium between the advantages and 
inconveniences of both. Additionally, we can say that the ownership structure, whether 
concentrated or diffused, and whether the major shareholders sustain or not the control, 
influences the decision making, the investment’s opportunities and consequently the 
firm’s performance. 
 
2.1 INSIDER OWNERSHIP AND PERFORMANCE 
The company’s performance may be affected by manager’s decisions as he can use the 
firm’s resources to maximize his wealth rather than the firm’s profits (Oswald and 
Jahera Jr., 1991; Pegels et al., 2000). In their seminal paper, Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) observed that insider ownership can influence the firm’s strategic behavior and 
corporate performance. That influence has been further studied by other researchers, in 
different national contexts and using diverse models. Mehran (1995), on 153 U.S. 
manufacturing firms during the period from 1979 to 1980, and Morck et al. (2000) on 
373 Japanese manufacturing firms in 1986 found a positive relationship between insider 
ownership and firm performance. They concluded that as the ownership by managers 
rises, the free-rider problem of monitoring is curbed in consequence of the alignment of 
interests between managers and shareholders. Then, managers will try to maximize 
performance through investment in projects that add value to the firm. According to 
some researchers, managers can entrench themselves, leading to a decrease in the 
performance. Jensen and Ruback (1983) were among the first to explain both the 
alignment and the entrenchment effect. In the beginning, as alignment mechanisms 
increase and insider ownership raises, the agency costs decrease and the firm’s 
performance increases. At intermediate levels of insider ownership the costs of the 
convergence effect (coincidence of ideas about how to govern a firm) are higher than its 
gains, and so managers’ and other shareholders’ interests may diverge. Additionally, 
managers can create a board difficult to monitor or try to preserve their job, even if they 
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are no longer competent or qualified to do it, leading to the entrenchment effect 
(Demsetz, 1983; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Faccio et al., 
2001; Anderson et al., 2003). Managers can maximize their self-interest, steal profit, 
output, assets or other securities of the firm they control, as well as overpay themselves 
or install unqualified family members in management positions, or make themselves 
irreplaceable (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Denis et al., 1999; La Porta et al., 2000; Gomez-
Mejia and Nuñez-Nickel, 2001). Managers can also choose to invest in projects with 
low or negative returns, but that may satisfy their own expectations, and so agency costs 
increase due to coordination problems between shareholder and manager. Reaching 
higher levels of insider ownership, the performance increases because the firm’s owner 
exerts the role of manager and obtains an incentive to avoid share-price decreasing 
decisions (Loderer and Martin, 1997).  
Many researchers, analyzing the relationship between insider ownership and 
performance of one country found two inflection points, yet, the percentages of shares 
possessed by managers varied between studies, as the models analyzed and variables 
used differ. Some authors used accounting measures to calculate the firm’s performance 
(Kumar, 2003), while others used market measures (Miguel et al., 2004); some 
controlled a few number of variables (Gedajilovic and Shapiro, 2002) while others 
extended the control variables to a group (Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001). Their 
findings also diverge significantly. Morck et al. (1988) found a maximum point of 
performance at 5 percent of insider ownership and a minimum at 25 percent when 
analyzing the relationship pf Tobin’s Q and insider ownership of 371 Fortune 500 U.S. 
firms. However, the relationship is weaker and instable because excluding the large 
firms of the sample generates different results. Part of this relationship, the alignment 
effect, was confirmed by Stulz (1988), McConnel and Servaes (1990) and Han an Suk 
(1998), who found a maximum at 40-50 percent of insider ownership when analyzing 
firms from the U.S., but failed to prove it at higher levels of insider ownership, due to 
lack of results’ robustness. The level of shares possessed by managers is positively 
related to stock returns until it rises to 41.8 percent, because the managers’ interests are 
more aligned with those of outside shareholders and hence the agency costs diminish. 
However, after that level, corporate performance decreases due to the problem 
associated with managers’ entrenchment. Mudambi and Nicosia (1998) who analyze the 
relationship of the U.K. financial services industry during the period from 1992 to 1994, 
found a maximum at a higher level of insider ownership, 11 percent. In addition Cho 
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(1998), in order to analyze the impact of insider ownership on the firm’s investment, 
replicates the study of Morck et. al (1988) and McConnel and Servaes (1990) being the 
firm’s investment measured by capital expenditures and R&D expenditures of U.S. 
firms. Firm’s performance is found to first increase until insider ownership reaches 7 
percent, then decreases when managers own between 7 to 38 percent of the firm’s 
shares and, beyond 38 percent the relationship becomes positive again. Holderness et al. 
(1999) found a maximum at 5 percent of insider ownership and a minimum at 25 
percent when analyzing firms from the U.S., but the relation found is weaker because it 
was not statistically significant. Short and Keasey (1999) found that U.K. managers get 
entrenchment when insider ownership is between 12.99 and 41.99 percent. Also Faccio 
and Lasfer (1999) also discovered two inflection points when analyzing the relationship 
between insider ownership and firm performance of U.K. companies. They found a 
maximum at 19.68 percent and a minimum at 54.12 percent. However these inflection 
points vary depending on the measure of performance used and the relationship appears 
to be weaker especially to low growth firms. Kumar (2003) found that shareholding by 
managers in India affects negatively the firm’s performance measured by the ratio ROA 
when insider ownership is at low levels of concentration (until 24 percent), increasing at 
higher levels because the interests of managers and shareholders are aligned. Miguel et 
al. (2004) analyzed the relationship between firm performance and insider ownership of 
the Spanish firms during the period from 1990 to 1999 and found two inflection points: 
a maximum at 35 percent and a minimum at 70 percent of insider ownership, 
confirming both alignment and entrenchment effect. Furthermore, Cui and Mak (2002) 
found other type of non monotonic relationship, a W-shaped relationship, when 
analyzing high R&D firms listed on NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ. This kind of firms 
has distinct characteristics, such as high growth opportunities and information 
asymmetry, different board structures and different ownership structures, which justify 
the different relationship found. They found a minimum at 10 and 50 percent, and a 
maximum at 30 percent. From the information stated above we can conclude that 
insider ownership does not substitute other mechanisms to solve agency problems 
because, even if it reduces agency costs, it does not eliminate them. As a result, it is 
necessary to combine other mechanisms, as monetary incentives for achieving a good 
performance (Holderness et al., 1999). 
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Why have these studies obtained different results? We cannot forget that the type of 
corporate governance, more specifically the system of rules and codes of conduct that 
disciplines the firm’s control and influences the firm’s performance, varies around the 
world. Consequently, it is normal that, for some countries, managers get entrenched at 
higher levels than for other countries. Moreover, the agency costs vary from firm to firm 
and from country to country, depending on the competition of the labor market, on the 
facility that managers can exercise their own preferences, on the level of the 
monitoring’ activity costs and on the residual nature of their non pecuniary claims 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Loderer and Martin, 1997). However, not only the 
differences in ownership structure across countries explain the results’ discrepancy, but 
also other factors. Kole (1995) found that the variations in the results are not due to 
differences in ownership data, but can depend on the firm size or on the model 
analyzed. Size also plays a role, as medium and large companies will have a different 
performance from small firms mainly due to economies of scale, knowledge of the 
market, and facility to hire better managers. The type of industry, financial or other, can 
also influence the results obtained on the link between management ownership and 
performance. So when the study is restricted to a specific type of company the 
comparisons of results may not be reliable. In terms of the model analyzed each group 
of researchers define model, controlling different variables such as R&D intensity, 
advertising intensity, debt, or age, which can bias the comparisons across studies. 
Additionally, the variables used in each study are taken from different databases, some 
of which may be less reliable. Hence, to make effective comparisons across countries, 
some researchers extended their study to a diversity of countries. It was the case of 
Kaplan (1997) who analyzed the U.S., Japan and Germany. The U.S. firms’ ownership 
appeared to be more dispersed, while in Japan and Germany the firms’ ownership was 
more concentrated. Additionally, the managers’ behavior also diverges across these 
countries. While managers’ poor past performance is quickly corrected in the U.S. 
through the market for corporate control, and in Japan through the monitoring of banks, 
in Germany the relations are established in a long run and there is not enough effort to 
correct the inefficiencies. However, managers from the three countries seem to be 
affected by similar forces, since all firms want to maximize their performance and 
sustain their position in the market. 
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2.2 OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE AND PERFORMANCE 
Performance is not only influenced by insider ownership but also by the ownership 
structure, because the latter influences the firm’s growth opportunities and efficiency in 
risk taking (Chaganti and Damanpour, 1991; Bajaj et al., 1998). There are two major 
types of ownership: concentrated and dispersed ownership. The first group typically 
made up of family firms, is more important in Japan and Continental Europe, as well as 
non financial and small firms. It is characterized by having a major shareholder, 
individual or institution and, additionally, a few minority shareholders. The firm’ 
control is maintained by the large shareholder or he can hire a professional manager that 
will be highly monitored. Therefore, the free-riding problems between managers and 
shareholders are reduced, since the interests of both parties are aligned. Furthermore, 
shareholders have a propensity to be risk averse, preferring a conservative management, 
with efficient strategies in order to pass the firm onto the next generations (Franks and 
Mayer, 1997; La Porta et al., 1999; Anderson and Reeb, 2003). However, being all the 
relationships established in a long term it may be difficult to correct poor past 
performance and to create benefits for the firm (Kaplan, 1997). Moreover, the owners 
can be less experienced than professional managers or knowledgeable and not 
motivated to innovate. Another problem occurs when the company has financial needs 
that exceed its internal resources because, as the market is illiquid, there are no 
individuals interested in paying the real amount of the firm’ shares. Additionally, the 
major owner can avoid situations which lead to a dilution of his control, and 
preferentially establish strait relationship with banks to solve the firm’ financial needs 
rather than increase equity. Finally, concentrated ownership may lead to worse 
performance due to the conflict between controlling owners and minority shareholders, 
as the major shareholder can try to appropriate the firm’s wealth in order to maximize 
his personal utility. The second type of ownership structure, designed by dispersed 
ownership, is common in the U.S. and the U.K., as well as in financial and large firms. 
It is characterized by separated ownership and control, which creates free-riding 
problems because managers can act in disregard for the shareholders interests. 
Moreover, there are multiple minority investors and it is likely that no investor alone 
has interests enough to control the firm who exercises control has costs to do so and 
profits when are generate, include all shareholders, which means that the marginal cost 
of monitoring normally exceeds the benefits of improved performance (Anderson and 
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Reeb, 2003). This type of ownership structure dominates in countries where all 
investors are protected by law from expropriation in order to avoid the problem of 
loosing investors’ wealth while detaining only a small part of the company. As the 
market for these companies is liquid, and inherently, the shares are correctly valuated, it 
is easy to increase the firm’s equity rather than increase debt to finance investments, 
leading to a faster business growth. Moreover, there are efficiencies in decision making 
due to audacious investment policies, to innovation incentive, and to risk diversification 
(Eisenberg et al., 1998), even if shareholders have little incentive to monitor managers 
due to the low difference between costs and benefits.  
 
There is no satisfactory way of choosing the optimal ownership structure (Cubin and 
Leech, 1983). Each owner, according with his specific characteristics chooses to detain 
or not the majority of the firm’s shares (Denis and Denis, 1994) taking the benefits-
costs relation in account. Considering agency problems, it appears that family firms 
perform better than non-family firms because this institutional form solves the 
divergence of interests between shareholders and managers. Nevertheless, if there is 
more than one shareholder, there may be problems among majority and minority 
shareholders. Concentrated ownership is the predominant type of firms around the 
world especially because investors are poorly protected by law from expropriation, 
which provides an incentive for the large shareholder to control managers. 
Consequently, as the proportion of shares held by large shareholders rise, their interests 
and those of the firm are aligned, leading to an increase in the firm’s performance 
(Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Shleifer and Vishny, 1986, 1997). However, major 
shareholders can pursue certain strategies that maximize their wealth rather than the 
profit of all shareholders. Such divergence of interests between majority and minority 
shareholders is another source of agency costs. The dominant shareholder can 
expropriate minority investors by excluding them from decision-making, and establish 
excessive compensation packages for himself or limit the firm’s growth to increase his 
wealth rather than the firm’s, generating worse performance (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; 
Anderson et al., 2003). Besides, family ownership limits the potential for diversification 
and growth, as managers have less incentive to search for new investments. 
Additionally, the influence of family ownership in the performance depend on the form 
of family control and management: when the founder is the manager of the firm, the 
performance increases, but when the manager is a heir, the efficiency may not increase 
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as their attitude may be more defensive (Villalonga and Amit, 2006). Conversely, 
ownership dispersion can lead to free-riding problems between managers and 
shareholders, because ownership and control are usually separated and, consequently, 
managers can act differently from shareholders’ expectation. As the number of shares 
detained by a single owner decreases, his incentive to monitor also diminishes, because 
his controlling costs are higher than his gains, which are in proportion with his holdings 
(Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Leech and Leahy, 1991; Hart, 1995; Ang et al., 2000; 
Gomez-Mejia and Nuñez-Nickel, 2001). Furthermore, firms with dispersed ownership 
benefit from the quick correction of managers’ poor past performance, especially when 
the market for corporate control is active and from managers incentive to look for new 
and innovative projects, leading to the firms’ performance maximization (Burkart et al., 
1997). Managers are motivated to present innovative projects and to have a good 
performance to sustain their presence in the company. In conclusion, we can say that 
shareholders choose the firm’s ownership structure taking into account the trade-off 
between the incentive benefits of concentrated ownership and the costs arising from 
excessive concentration of risk, as well as the potential for expropriation of minority 
investors (Cubbin and Leech, 1983).  Hence, the structure of ownership is not the same 
to each firm, but rather it is an element that characterizes the firm. 
 
Many researchers analyzed the link between ownership and performance in order to 
determine the existence of an optimal structure of ownership. For instance, Leech and 
Leahy (1991) found a significant negative and linear relationship between firm 
performance and ownership concentration on their study of 470 U.K. listed firms. It 
appeared that firms with dispersed ownership were more diversified than firms with 
concentrated ownership, as well as investments in higher value projects due to the risk 
diversity they take. Additionally, the market for the firm’s shares in case of ownership 
concentration was less developed and so the market discipline had a weaker effect on 
controlling managers’ strategies. Later, in 1998, Mudambi and Nicosia confirmed this 
relation between ownership concentration and firm performance when analyzing the 
U.K. financial services industry. Contrary to these results, Wruck (1988) found a 
positive relationship between firm performance and the fraction of shares owned by the 
U.S. institutional investors. Such relationship confirms the monitoring effect that arises 
when there is a dominant shareholder. However, the U.S. is a country where the legal 
system is strong and minority investors are protected. This protects the interests of 
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minorities, reducing the divergence with dominant shareholders, which leads to an 
increase in the firm’s wealth. Eisenberg et al. (1998) analyzed the interaction of the 
board size in the profitability of 900 small and midsize Finnish firms, including wealthy 
and bankrupt firms during the period between 1992 and 1994 finding that dispersed 
ownership leads to a decline in the performance. As the board size is more concentrated 
and the interests of managers and owners coincide, the firm’s performance increases, 
reducing the free-riding problems. However, we cannot forget that the authors restricted 
their analysis to small firms, which are normally characterized by a concentration of 
ownership and control. In this case, it is expected that the manager tries to maximize the 
performance as it leads to an increase in his own wealth. Therefore, the results found in 
this study can be different from the ones expected in a study of larger firms, because, as 
we already mentioned, managers’ behavior can diverge according to their power and 
prestige in the firm. The monitoring and discipline role played by the major shareholder 
was also confirmed by Morck et al. (2000), who analyzed Japanese firms. In Japan, 
investors are poorly protected by the legal system and most firms are characterized by 
ownership concentration. However, Japanese minorities, contrary to minority investors 
of other countries with equally weak legal system, are not expropriated since banks have 
an important role in controlling the firm performance, leading to the convergence of 
interests of both minor and large shareholders, as well as of both managers and 
shareholders. This positive and linear relationship between ownership structure and firm 
performance of Japanese corporations was also found by Gedajilovic and Shapiro 
(2002), that confirmed that Japanese large shareholders are motivated to and capable of 
monitoring managers for the reasons explained above (Morck et al., 2000). This relation 
between ownership structure and performance is, according to other authors, non linear. 
Anderson and Reeb (2003) restricted their study to the 500 Standard & Poors finding 
that firm performance increases till ownership structure reaches around 31 percent and 
decreases afterwards due to the expropriation of minorities. The authors found that 
when dominant shareholders have enough power to decide alone on firm’s issues, they 
can maximize their wealth at the expense of maximizing the firms’ value, leading to 
conflicts of interests between minority and dominant shareholder. Miguel et al. (2004) 
also found a nonlinear relationship when analyzing the Spanish firms, concluding that 
the market value of the firm’s shares increases till ownership concentration reaches 87 
percent, due to the monitoring effect, but over that point minority shareholders can be 
expropriated, which leads to a decrease in the performance. Even though both Anderson 
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and Reeb, and Miguel et al. agree on the nonlinearity of the relation between ownership 
and performance, they diverge on the inflection point. This can be explained by the 
differences in the rights of shareholders of the countries used in the studies, since in 
Spain shareholders can need a higher number of shares to have enough power to decide 
alone. In conclusion, there is not consensus on the optimal ownership structure and it 
appears that one cannot talk about one, either, since for one group of countries the 
ownership diversification is more advantageous as a minority investor can be 
expropriated, whereas for other countries ownership concentration will provide control 
of the managers’ behavior. 
 
Divergence in corporate governance systems around the world related to differences in 
the legal protection of investors and its enforcement, the development of capital 
markets, the role of the market for corporate control, the industry, the competition, and 
others (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; La Porta et al., 1998) can explain the differences in 
results of the relationship between firm’s performance and both ownership 
concentration and insider ownership. In countries with weaker legal systems as French 
civil law countries, shareholder’s voting rights are normally violated and, therefore 
large shareholders are motivated to monitor managers, avoiding agency costs and 
leading to an increase in the performance. As the market discipline in these countries is 
less developed, shareholders prefer to own the majority of the firm’s shares and control 
(Leech and Leahy, 1991). In countries where investors are protected by law from 
expropriation, as it is the case of the Common Law countries, the dispersion of 
ownership is more frequent. In these countries investors can diversify risk and, 
inherently, attract more investors to the firm. However, when managers are effectively 
in control, it can be difficult for shareholders to replace them. Beyond the difference of 
legal system, a fraction of cross-sectional variation in firms’ performance can be 
explained by unobserved firm heterogeneity (Kumar, 2003). Differences among 
different studies can likewise be biased due to differences in the models and data used, 
which reinforces the need for cross-national studies of corporate governance. That was 
the case of Gedajilovic and Shapiro (1998) who analyzed 5 countries: the U.S., the 
U.K., Germany, France and Canada, and failed to confirm that performance is affected 
by differences in the systems of corporate governance. The researchers found a non 
linear relationship between ownership concentration and firm value in the U.S.: for low 
concentration levels, the performance decreases due to divergence of interests among 
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shareholders and to excessive diversification; as ownership concentration increases, the 
performance also increases. Ownership structure appeared to be unrelated to 
performance in the case of the U.K., France and Canada, whereas in Germany 
ownership concentration led to higher performance because it limited managerial 
divergence. Lastly, they found that, in general, firms which grow faster are, on average, 
more profitable. Thomsen and Pedersen (2000) also used the cross-national technique to 
analyze large companies from 12 European nations: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain and 
Sweden, during the period between 1991 and 1996. They found that ownership 
concentration per se does not influence the rate of return. A nonlinear relation between 
ownership concentration and firm performance was also found. They concluded that 
performance rises until ownership concentration reaches 66 percent, but exceeding 
beyond this level of ownership concentration, the performance decreases due to the 
entrenchment effect and rising risks increase. These results are related to the fact that in 
these countries the protection of minority is too small, and consequently, the interests of 
minorities are not taken into account by the major shareholder, leading to agency costs 
and to the decrease in the firm’s performance. Moreover, these researchers used the 
market-to-book value and the return on assets to measure firm’s performance, while 
most researchers use the Tobin’s Q ratio. Also Claessens et al. (2002) analyzed the 
large traded corporations in 8 East Asian economies: Hong Kong, Indonesia, South 
Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan and Thailand, and found that the 
firm’s value increases with the cash flow ownership of the largest shareholder, due to 
the incentive effect. However, it falls when the control right of the largest shareholder 
exceeds its cash flow ownership because of the entrenchment effect. On one hand, the 
major shareholders are motivated to control managers, in order to maximize their firms’ 
wealth and are able to collect information and oversee managers. However, on the other 
hand, the problem of entrenchment and value extraction can occur, being especially 
pronounced when there is a big divergence between control and cash flow rights. The 
same group of countries was also analyzed by Lemmon and Lins (2003) during the 
financial crisis of 1997, who concluded that firms in which minority shareholders are 
most subject to expropriation have a Tobin's Q 12 percent smaller then other firms. 
However, they failed to confirm the difference between firms with a separation between 
cash flow rights and control rights and firms with no separation. Finally, more recently, 
Maury (2006), that restricted his analysis to family firms from Western Europe (Austria, 
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Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland and the U.K.), found that active family control leads to an increase in the 
performance, as the agency problem between ownership and managers is solved and, 
therefore, the firm’s efficiency may improve. However, they found no difference 
between passive family ownership and non family ownership. 
 
2.3 ENDOGENEITY 
Most studies found that ownership structure and managerial ownership have a 
significant impact on performance. However some exceptions have to be pointed. 
Demsetz and Lehn (1985) studied 511 large corporations, and found no relation 
between ownership and performance, having concluded that since individuals choose 
the ownership structure that minimizes their costs, the studies previously developed 
could be biased. A similar conclusion was drawn by Cho (1998), Himmelberg et al. 
(1999), and Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) who suggested that ownership variables are 
endogenously determined in equilibrium by changes in ownership structure in order to 
achieve the firm’s performance maximization. Moreover these researchers believe that 
the results found by the generality of researchers can be spurious, because performance 
can influence ownership structure rather than the opposite. The investor chooses an 
ownership structure when the firm is created. If its performance is small by comparison 
with the competition or the investors’ expectations, he can change the ownership 
structure by rearranging his portfolio in order to maximize both the firm and his own 
wealth. Therefore, it seems that not only firm’s performance will influence the 
ownership structure, but the contrary will be also true, and so ownership structure per se 
may not influence the firm’s performance, but there may be other variables that 
influence it such as debt, market force, competition and others (Thomsen and Pedersen, 
2000). Nevertheless, Zhou (2001) found that ownership structure remains stable over 
the years, meaning that significant adaptation and coordination costs preclude the yearly 
adaptation of ownership structure. Since ownership can be shared by several investors, 
it may be complex to reach a common agreement on ownership structure modifications. 
If a firm has a concentrated ownership, it can be complicated to find investors interested 
in paying the real value for the firm’s shares and to persuade investors to share the 
firm’s control. In case of multiple shareholders it may be complex to encourage 
investors to sell their shares to a dominant shareholder. Consequently, if on one hand it 
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is logic for the ownership structure to change over time in order to satisfy investors’ 
may aim, on the other hand investors’ inertia blocs the firm portfolio rearrangement.  
 
In the following section we describe the model used in this study to analyze the 
relationship between both insider ownership and ownership structure, and performance. 
The results will be tested for results’ robustness, in order to support our results and 
conclusions. 
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3. THEORY, HYPOTHESIS AND MODEL 
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In this section we first present the hypotheses developed as the basis of our study, and 
explain their theoretical background. Finally, we describe the models that will be used 
to test each hypothesis. 
 
3.1 THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
Our study focuses on two main points: insider ownership and ownership structure. 
Initially, we hypothesize how ownership influences performance. Additionally, we try 
to explain the differences found across industries and nations. Finally, we address the 
endogeneity problem, in order to confirm the robustness of the results.  
 
3.1.1 Insider Ownership and Performance 
As we stated before, ownership and control can be separated, as the shareholder can hire 
a professional manager who is responsible for the definition of the firm’s strategy and 
investments. However, the manager can allocate the firm’s resources in his own interest, 
since there may be divergences in the interests of managers and shareholders: 
shareholders want to maximize their wealth while managers prefer to satisfy their self-
interest. This may generate significant “agency costs” leading to a decline in the firm’s 
performance. As seen earlier, one way to align managers’ interests with those of 
shareholders consists in encouraging managers to acquire the company’s shares. Larger 
manager ownership is expected to raise the performance. Nevertheless, some 
researchers1, as Morck et al. (1988), Short and Keasey (1999), Kumar (2003), and 
Miguel et al. (2004) found a cubic relationship between performance and insider 
ownership. When the percentage of shares in the hands of managers is at intermediate 
levels, it may be difficult to monitor managers who try to keep their job, even if they are 
inefficient. Moreover, managers can appropriate profits and make decisions that satisfy 
their individual interests, which leads to the expropriation effect and, consequently, to a 
decrease of the performance. At higher levels of insider ownership, shareholders and 
managers are the same person and the interests of both parties are more clearly aligned. 
Consequently the manager will try to increase the firm’s performance as it increases his 
own wealth (figure 1). 
 
                                                 
1
 All previous researches are summarized in Table 13, in attachment. 
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Picture 1: Graphical Representation of the Influence of Insider 
Ownership on Firm Performance 
 
Hypothesis 1: Firm’s performance increases with insider ownership at low levels, then 
at intermediate levels the performance decreases due to the entrenchment effect, and 
finally at higher levels of insider ownership firm’s performance increases again 
because of the alignment effect. 
 
 
3.1.2 Ownership Structure and Performance 
The ownership structure, whether it is concentrated or dispersed, influences the 
relationship between the company and other stakeholders, the investment opportunities, 
the firm’s growth and, consequently, the performance. The dispersion of ownership is 
normally associated with innovative and audacious investments, because the risk is 
diversified among shareholders. Nevertheless, it may imply problems of communication 
and coordination, due to the diversity of shareholders and to the separation of ownership 
and control. Likewise, shareholders need to monitor managers in order to avoid 
expropriation. However, since monitoring is costly and benefits all shareholders, in the 
percentage of their holdings, and not only the shareholders that paid the costs, no one is 
interested on doing it. This phenomenon leads to free-riding problems and to a decrease 
in the performance. As the number of shareholders decreases, the problems of 
communication and coordination also diminishes, the interests of all shareholders get 
aligned, and inherently the performance will increase. Although, according to 
Gedajlovic and Shapiro (1998, 2002), Thomsen and Pedersen (2000) and Miguel et al. 
(2004), among others2, this is a nonlinear relationship in which at high levels of 
                                                 
2All previous researches are summarized in Table 14, in attachment.  
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ownership concentration, performance decreases because the major shareholder can be 
motivated to expropriate minority’ wealth by achieving his personal non-value-
maximization objectives rather than the firm’s wealth objective. Therefore, the 
divergence of interests between large and minor shareholders leads to another problem 
of “agency costs”, which in turns decreases the firm performance (figure 2). 
 
firm
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3S1 ownership
monitoring expropriation structure
 
Picture 2: Graphical Representation of the Influence of Ownership 
Structure on Firm Performance 
 
Hypothesis 2: As ownership concentration increases, the firm’s performance raises due 
to the monitoring effect, but at higher levels of concentration the performance decreases 
because of the expropriation of minorities. 
 
3.1.3 Variations across Industries and Countries 
This study is based on companies from 9 Continental European countries: Portugal, 
Spain, France, Germany, Belgium, Italy, Greece, Austria and Finland, and 12 industries, 
namely basic materials, capital goods, conglomerates, consumer cyclical, consumer 
non-cyclical, energy, financial, healthcare, services, technology, transportation and 
utilities (taken from the variable Reuters sector existent in the Reuters’ database). Both 
country and industry variables can influence the performance, because each country and 
industry provides similar environmental conditions, including concentration, research 
and development, competitiveness, maturity, growth opportunities, financial pressure 
and others. We first grouped the data by industry to measure its impact on the firm’s 
performance.  
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Hypothesis 3: Companies from different industries enjoy different levels of 
performance. 
 
Then we grouped the data by country and analyzed the effect of each in the 
performance, since companies from the same country have the same macroeconomics 
scenario.  
 
Hypothesis 4: Companies from different nations enjoy different levels of performance. 
 
3.1.4 Endogeneity 
Finally we addressed the endogeneity problem in order to verify if the results found in 
this study are spurious or not. The importance of endogeneity and simultaneity was 
stated by several researchers (Demsetz, 1983; Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Cho, 1998; 
Himmelberg et al., 1999; Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001) when analyzing the influence 
of ownership structure on firm performance. The ownership structure appears to be less 
stable over the years (Zhou, 2001) and can change due to internal or external factors. 
Investors can rearrange their portfolios in order to increase the firm’s performance or 
maximize their own interests. Likewise, the performance can be endogenously 
determined, which leads the results found to be unrealistic. This process is complex and 
difficult to achieve: in the case of concentrated ownership, investors may not want to 
surrender the firm’s control; within dispersed ownership, shareholders may not want to 
sell their shares to a group of individuals. Moreover, ownership structure per se may not 
influence the firm’s performance, as other influencing variables such as debt, market 
force, or competition may be at stake (Thomsen and Pedersen, 2000). In this direction, 
our study analyzes whether the firm’s benefits can overtake the costs generated by the 
modification of the ownership structure. Being the ownership structure an exogenous 
variable, the results of our study will present robustness. 
 
Hypothesis 5: Ownership structure is an exogenous variable and so all the results found 
are robust. 
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3.2 MODEL 
In this section we present the different models used to test the hypotheses explained 
before. The Ordinary Least Square method was used to estimate the equations of the 
first three subsections, whereas the Two Stages Least Square estimation was used to 
address the endogeneity. Two measures of firms’ performance were chosen: a market 
measure- Tobin’s Q and an accounting measure - Return on Assets. Likewise, control 
variables were used because it is expected that the firm’s performance is not only 
influenced by the ownership structure but also by some external and internal 
environments. Finally, we included i firms, during t periods (from 2000 till 2004). We 
choose the year 2000 to start the analysis since all accounting data will be in Euros, and 
finish in 2004, the last year with available data. 
 
3.2.1 Insider Ownership and Performance 
The first hypothesis was tested using a cubic relationship between insider ownership 
and firm performance (equation 1). Such relationship allows us to validate both the 
alignment at lower and higher levels of insider ownership and the entrenchment effect. 
Moreover, following the studies of researchers such as Himmelberg et al. (1999), Cui 
and Mak (2002), Kumar (2003) and Miguel et al. (2004) six control variables were 
included: firm’s size, age, growth opportunities, debt intensity, capital intensity and 
R&D intensity.  
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Equation 1: How Does Insider Ownership Influences Firm Performance? A Cubic 
Relationship 
 
We also verify if, instead of a cubic relationship, a quadratic relationship between 
insider ownership and firm performance exists, because some studies such as Kumar 
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(2003) and Han and Suk (1998) found only one inflection point. The inclusion of this 
analysis is due to a possible alignment effect at low levels of shares possessed by 
managers and to an entrenchment effect after these levels. Finally we analyze the 
presence of a linear relationship because Mehran (1995) and Morck et al. (2000) only 
confirm the alignment effect, it means, as the percentage of shares detained by 
shareholders increase, the performance also increases. 
 
 
3.2.2 Ownership Structure and Performance 
The second hypothesis was tested by the firms’ performance running a regression of 
ownership concentration, which is measured through the percentage of shares possessed 
by the three major shareholders, as well as its square, in order to validate the monitoring 
and expropriation effect. Six control variables were also included: firm’s size, age, 
growth opportunities, debt intensity, capital intensity and R&D intensity (equation 2), 
following Gegajlovic and Shapiro (1998 and 2002), Himmelberg et al. (1999), Kumar 
(2003), Anderson and Reeb (2003) and Miguel et al. (2004), among others.  
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Equation 2: How Does Ownership Structure Influences Firm Performance? 
 
We also confirm the presence of a linear relationship because Wruck (1988), Eisenberg 
et al. (1998), Morck et al. (2000) and Gedajlovic and Shapiro (2002) only confirm the 
monitoring effect. 
 
 
3.2.3 Variations Across Industries and Countries 
Equations 1 and 2 will be tested once more, but considering each industry and country, 
in order to measure the specific impact of industry and country of origin on 
performance.  
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3.2.4 Endogeneity 
Finally, the relationship between ownership structure and firms’ performance is 
examined, in order to check whether it is a spurious one, injected by omitted variables. 
To do so, two equations will be estimated simultaneously (equation 3 and 4).  
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Equation 3: Performance Estimation 
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Equation 4: Ownership Structure Estimation 
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4. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
44 
4.1 DATA SOURCES AND SAMPLE SELECTION 
For our study we selected Continental European firms since the majority of the 
researches have been conducted in the U.S., the U.K. and Japan, in detriment of other 
countries. That means that other countries are sub-analyzed and, considering the role 
they have in corporate world (for example German firms), they are important to 
consider. We choose 9 European countries understudied in previous research, in order to 
comprehend the European context and to facilitate international comparisons. The 
sample includes all companies, from those 9 countries, included in the WorldScope 
database: Portugal, Spain, France, Belgium, Germany, Italy, Greece, Austria and 
Finland. The New European Countries were excluded due to the difficulty to secure 
sufficient data for the period in analysis (2000-2004).  
 
All the financial data has been sourced from the DataStream database and the ownership 
information from Reuters. The initial sample contained about 3,400 firms, but after 
excluding missing financial data, especially the ratios of debt, market to book value and 
return on assets, the sample size came down to 2,105 companies. The lack of ownership 
data for some of the firms decreased the sample further to 884 companies.  
 
 
Medium Number 
of Companies 
Percentage of the 
Sample 
Austria 36 4,07% 
Belgium 14 1,58% 
Finland 87 9,84% 
France 40 4,52% 
Greece 103 11,65% 
Germany 340 38,46% 
Italy 143 16,18% 
Spain 88 9,95% 
Portugal 33 3,73% 
Table 1: Structure of the Sample 
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4.2 VARIABLES 
We included key variables associated with the ownership structure, more specifically 
with ownership concentration and insider ownership, and with firms’ performance. 
Additionally, we included some control variables, which may also influence the 
relationships analyzed. 
 
4.2.1 Ownership Variables 
In terms of ownership variables we measured both the presence of large shareholders 
and management ownership, using Reuters’ database. According to Zhou (2001), the 
ownership structure changes very slowly over time, so we assumed that the ownership 
pattern remained stable among sampled firms over the period 2000-2004. 
 
 INSIDER OWNERSHIP 
Insider ownership (IO) was measured as the percentage of ownership held by the 
President, Chief Executive Officer, Chairman and Vice-chairman of the board and 
Executive Director. This data was collected from Reuters’ database. In countries where 
firms are mostly widely held, the ownership and control are normally separated, which 
can lead to problems of convergence of interests between them. Consequently, 
managers are offered shares as part of their compensation package, in order to align 
their interests with the shareholders’. On the other hand, firms with concentrated 
ownership are mainly controlled by a dominant shareholder and, so, free-riding 
problems are minimized. This variable enables the study of the implication of 
ownership concentration on insider ownership, as well as its influence on the 
performance. 
 
 LARGE OWNERSHIP 
The variable “large shareholders” (3S) was measured by the proportion of shares held 
by the three largest shareholders. The major shareholder can be the State, a family, a 
foreign investor, a financial institution or an individual. We have not classified 
ownership into these categories due to the difficulty of finding such specific 
information. Moreover, Faccio and Lang (2002) found that, typically, the firms can be 
categorized into two main groups: widely held or family controlled. The majority of 
Continental European firms (53.99 percent) are family held. These researchers 
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concluded that 60.34 percent of Portuguese firms, 55.79 percent of Spanish firms, 64.82 
percent of French firms, 51.54 percent of Belgian firms, 64.62 percent of German firms, 
52.86 percent of Austrian firms, and 48.84 percent of Finish firms are family controlled, 
while 28.68 percent of Finish firms, and 26.42 percent of Spanish firms are widely held. 
They did not include Greek firms in the analysis but, according to La Porta (1999), the 
generality of Greek firms is also controlled by families. Our sample includes Portugal, 
Spain, France, Belgium, Germany, Italy, Greece, Austria and Finland that have different 
ownership structure, so, we can verify whether differences across countries depend on 
the type of corporate governance or not. 
 
4.2.2 Firms’ Performance Variables 
To measure the firms’ performance we used both market and accounting measures, 
since there is no consensus about the optimal performance ratio. Market measures, as 
Tobin's Q ratio reflect all public information, but depend on the psychology of investors 
and can suffer from accounting artefact problems (the numerator is the market to book 
value, which can distort the performance in comparison to other firms). Accounting 
measures, on the other hand, are not adequate indicators of true performance due to their 
dependence on accounting practices and failure to take into account future prospects of 
firm’s performance (Oswald and Jahera Jr., 1991; Ely, 1991; Demsetz and Villalonga, 
2001). 
 
 TOBIN’S Q 
The Tobin's Q ratio (Q) was calculated dividing the market to book value plus debt by 
the total assets (Faccio and Lasfer, 1999:12, Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001:219). The 
majority of researchers used this ratio as a proxy of firm’s performance, because it 
transmits market’s image of the performance of the firm, taking into account both the 
past and the future perspectives of the performance. 
 
 RETURN ON ASSETS 
Finally, the return on assets (ROA) was obtained directly from DataStream’s item of 
ROA. Gedajlovic and Shapiro (1998), Eisenberg et al. (1998), and others used this ratio 
to measure the performance because it measures the efficiency with which corporate 
assets are managed. 
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We expect Return on Assets and Tobin's Q to be correlated, as they measure, in 
different perspectives, the same variable: performance. 
 
IV.2.3 Control Variables 
We also included firm characteristics as control variables, to identify other possible 
determinants of performance not captured by the ownership variables. The control 
variables have been selected with reference to previous studies. 
 
 SIZE 
We considered the firm’s size as a proxy of the natural logarithm of the company’s sales 
(ln Sale) as Leech and Leahy (1991), Himmelberg et al. (1999), Cui and Mak (2002), 
Kumar (2003), and other researchers did. The firm’s size has an ambiguous effect on its 
performance; on one hand, large firms have more agency costs because it is difficult to 
control all the activities, leading to a lower performance, but on the other hand large 
firms can benefit from economies of scale, better knowledge of markets and are able to 
hire more informed managers.  
 
 AGE 
The firm’s age (age) is measured by the number of years between the firm’s foundation 
and the year in analysis. According to Leech and Leahy (1991), Eisenberg (1998), 
Anderson and Reeb (2003), and Kumar (2003) this variable can influence the firm’s 
strategy and consequently its performance. Older firms can benefit from economies of 
scale, accumulated knowledge about the market, experience, and reputation. Yet, older 
firms may also be more inflexible and bureaucratic.  
 
 GROWTH OPPORTUNITIES 
We controlled growth opportunities (GO) measuring year-over-year sales, as Gedajlovic 
and Shapiro (1998, 2002) have done. Firms with high growth opportunities can have a 
better performance because there are many investment opportunities that can generate 
innovation and improve the firm’s efficiency. Furthermore, companies with low growth 
opportunities can have more agency costs as managers can make investments that 
maximize their self-interest at the expense of the company’s value maximization. 
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 DEBT INTENSITY 
The ratio of debt over total assets was directly taken from DataStream database and is 
an indicator of debt intensity (Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001; Cui and Mak, 2002; 
Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Kumar, 2003; Miguel et al., 2004). Firms with higher levels 
of debt tend to have better performance not only because of higher control from the debt 
holders, but also because managers have to pay the cost of capital. 
 
 CAPITAL INTENSITY 
Capital Intensity (CI), measured by capital-to-sales ratio, is directly taken from the 
DataStream database, and analyzes the importance of ‘hard’ capital5 in the firm’s 
technology. This ratio was first used by Demsetz and Lehn (1985), Kumar (2003), and 
other researchers, and is associated with the firm’s growth, because companies with 
more investment opportunities can spend more in new and innovative technology. 
 
 R&D INTENSITY 
We employed the ratio of R&D expenditures to sales in order to measure R&D intensity 
(RDI) (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001; Cui and Mak, 2002; 
Kumar, 2003) because firms with high R&D expenditures can have positive returns in 
the future and, consequently, can increase their performance. 
 
 ERROR 
itε  is automatically generated by the program Eviews and represents the error term. 
 
 
Table 2 presents the principal descriptive statistics: mean, medium, maximum, 
minimum and standard variation of each variable. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5
 Hard capital refers to installed capital (Kumar, 2003:12) 
  
 ROA Q IO IO2 IO3 S3 S32 Age Size GO Debt 
 Mean  1.743  0.258  0.133  0.069  0.042  0.423  0.269  7.636  12.221  0.774  25.078 
 Median  3.353  0.231  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.445  0.198  5.000  11.939  0.097  24.685 
 Maximum  488.574  21.871  1.000  1.000  1.000  0.998  0.996  27.000  18.815  280.658  92.380 
 Minimum -236.414  5.65E-07  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  5.798 -0.400  0.000 
 Std. Dev.  22.882  0.747  0.227  0.155  0.119  0.299  0.275  7.776  2.059  9.959  17.803 
 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
 
The variables are the following: ROA- Return on Assets, Q- Tobin’s Q, IO- percentage of insider ownership, IO2- square of the percentage of insider ownership, IO3- cubic of 
the percentage of insider ownership, S3- percentage of the three major shareholders, S32- square of the percentage of the three major shareholders, Age- firm age, Size- firm 
size, GO- growth opportunities, Debt- debt intensity 
 
 
 
 
 
Observation: 
We collected the data from the DataStream database in February and April 2006 and from Reuters in October and November 2006. 
  
 
 
 
5. RESULTS 
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5.1. Correlations 
To measure the linear relationship between two quantitative variables and to identify 
potential problems of multicolinearity we used the Pearson R correlation. This indicator 
varies between -1 and 1, and near the extreme values the linear association between 
variables is higher (Pestana and Gageiro, 1998). 
 
The table 3 reports the correlation matrix for the full sample. Contrary to our 
expectations, the two alternative measures of the firm’s performance, one based on 
accounting measures - ROA and another based on market measures Q (Tobin’s Q) are 
not correlated (0,015). Likewise these variables can not be alternative measures. The 
ratio ROA was taken from the DataStream database and so it is expected to be correctly 
calculated. By contrast, the ratio Tobin’s Q was calculated by us, using the Faccio and 
Lasfer, and Demsetz and Villalonga definition (Faccio and Lasfer, 1999:12, Demsetz 
and Villalonga, 2001:219). However, the variables used to construct the ratio, which 
were taken from the DataStream database, may not be the correct ones and consequently 
the ratio can be biased. The correlation between ROA and GO is 0.674, it means, that as 
ROA increases the variable GO also increases. The 0.303 correlation between 
manager’s ownership (IO) and the three major shareholders (3S) is justified because the 
firm’s owner can also be its manager. Moreover, none of the remaining variables is 
highly correlated, at least not to an extend which merits noting.  
 
5.2. Regression Results 
5.2.1. Insider Ownership and Performance 
The Ordinary Least Square Regression permits to analyze the relationship between one 
dependent variable and several explanatory variables (Brooks, 2002). 
 
After the analysis of the outliers, “observations that do not fit in with pattern of the 
remainder of the data” (Brooks, 2002:183), which was an examination of the 
standardized and studentized residuals, we take 31 outliers. Likewise, the data in 
analysis was reduced to 853 observations.6 
 
                                                 
6See Table 18, in attachment. 
  
 ROA Q IO IO2 IO3 S3 S32 Age Size GO Debt 
ROA  1.000           
Q  0.0152  1.000          
IO  0.120 -0.019  1.000         
IO2  0.107 -0.010  0.948  1.000        
IO3  0.087 -0.004  0.857  0.973  1.000       
S3  0.070  0.023  0.303  0.321  0.308  1.000      
S32  0.063  0.017  0.221  0.280  0.296  0.952  1.000     
Age  0.095  0.105 -0.099 -0.061 -0.035  0.103  0.115  1.000    
Size  0.182  0.118 -0.056 -0.042 -0.040 -0.012 -0.045  0.349  1.000   
GO  0.674 -0.004  0.054  0.046  0.031  0.038  0.046 -0.036 -0.007  1.000  
Debt  0.067  0.268  0.001  0.019  0.030 -0.031 -0.036  0.105  0.171 -0.006  1.000 
Table 3: Correlation Matrix 
 
The variables are the following: ROA- Return on Assets, Q- Tobin’s Q, IO- percentage of insider ownership, IO2- square of the percentage of insider ownership, IO3- cubic of 
the percentage of insider ownership, S3- percentage of the three major shareholders, S32- square of the percentage of the three major shareholders, Age- firm age, Size- firm 
size, GO- growth opportunities, Debt- debt intensity 
 
 
To test our first hypothesis we estimate the equation 1 analyzing the dependent variable 
firm’s performance against insider ownership. We make three tests for each variable 
that measure the firm’s performance: firstly we test a linear relationship between 
performance and insider ownership, then we test a quadratic relationship, and finally we 
test a cubic relationship. Only the first test represents a significant model. The results of 
cross-sectional Ordinary Least Square regressions of each of the two measures of the 
performance: ROA and Tobin’s Q are displayed in Table 4. Due to the lack of 
information we exclude the variables of Capital Intensity and R&D Intensity. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*, **, *** Significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively 
Table 4: Ordinary Least Squares regressions of ROA and Tobin’s Q and insider 
ownership 
 
62.91 percent (R2) of the firm’s performance, measured by the ratio ROA, are explained 
by the selected explanatory variables. We exclude the debt intensity ratio (Debt) 
because it was not an explanatory variable. We fail to confirm our first hypothesis, that 
there is a cubic relationship between ownership and performance. Nevertheless, firms’ 
performance is affected positively and significantly by insider ownership, it means, we 
only confirm the alignment effect like Mehran (1995) and Morck et al. (2000). We also 
confirm that the variables age, size and growth opportunities affect positively the firm’s 
performance at the 1 percent level of significance. May be there are other variables, 
 ROA Tobin’s Q 
C -19.6923 *** -0.2970 ** 
IO 8.4168 *** -0.0284 
Age 0.1680 *** 0.0057 * 
Size 1.4976 *** 0.0202 
GO 1.6209 ***  
Debt  0.011 *** 
R2 62,91% *** 7,84% 
Log Likelihood -3387.523 -939.0660 
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different from the ones used in the model, which explain the firm’s performance, as for 
example the law, the macroeconomy scenario and the industry influence, among others. 
 
As we conclude in the previous sub-section (5.1) the ratio Tobin’s Q is not a good ratio 
to measure the firm’s performance. Only 7.84 percent of the explanatory variables 
selected explain performance measured by Tobin’s Q. 
  
To validate the consistency of our model, we analyze the normality, the homecedasticity 
and the inexistence of the residuals autocorrelation, and the presence of 
multicolinearity. 
 Detection of heteroscedasticity 
One problem which may occur with the data is called heteroscedasticity, which means 
that we “wrongly conclude that the errors had constant variance” (Brooks, 2002:148). 
Likewise, to test this problem we use the White’s general test for heteroscedasticity. 
 
F-statistic 3.6966 *** 
Obs*R-squared 49.6117 *** 
*, **, *** Significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively 
Table 5: White Heteroskedasticity Test 
 
 
Since our probability is smaller than 5 percent of level of significance we reject the null 
hypothesis, it means, there exists heteroscedasticity, the Ordinary Least Squares 
estimators give unbiased coefficient estimates, but they are no longer BLUES (they do 
not have the minimum variance). To solve this problem, we use the option 
heteroscedasticity consistent coefficient covariance – White and find the same results of 
coefficients and probabilities with different standard error. 
 
 Autocorrelation Tests 
Another problem refers to the autocorrelation of the data, which occurs “whether any 
relationships exist between the current value and any of its previous values” (Brooks, 
2002: 156). In this case the data are not correlated with the previous ones since we use 
the average of the data. However, the same results are found if we use the Durbin and 
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Watson test. Since this test is equal to 1.88, close to 2, there is no evidence of 
autocorrelation in the residuals.   
 
 Normality Tests 
“The normality assumption ( ),0(~ 2σNut ) is required in order to conduct single or 
joint hypothesis tests about the model parameters” (Brooks, 2002: 178). To analyze this 
assumption we use the graphic Quantile-Quantile and the test Jarque-Bera. 
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Picture 3: Q-Q Plot (ROA) 
 
Analyzing the picture 3 we see that not all the data are near the linear line, which 
indicates the violation of the residuals’ normality hypothesis.  
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Mean       2.258324
Median   3.380000
Maximum  488.5700
Minimum -212.9800
Std. Dev.   21.17758
Skewness   12.58539
Kurtosis   340.6655
Jarque-Bera  4074908.
Probability  0.000000
 
Picture 4: Jarque-Bera Test (ROA) 
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Moreover, since the Jarque-Bera statistic is significant at a 5 percent level of 
significance we reject the normality which means that our results can be biased because 
the variable ROA does not assume a normal distribution as the model used requires, and 
so the coefficient estimates could be wrong. However, since our sample includes 853 
observations,“the sample is sufficiently large to not give great cause for concern” 
(Brooks, 2002:182). 
 
 Multicollinearity problems 
The Ordinary Least Squares estimation method assumes that the explanatory variables 
are not correlated with one another. Analyzing table 3 we verify that the independent 
variables are not significantly correlated, except when they are different metrics of the 
same variable. 
 
 
5.2.2. Ownership Structure and Performance 
To test the influence of the ownership structure on the firm’s performance we estimate 
equation 2. We verify the existence of non-linear equation and a linear equation 
between the performance measures ROA and Q, and the variable 3S (three major 
shareholders). Results are shown in table 6. 
 
 ROA Tobin’s Q 
C -18.8636 *** -0.3371 ** 
S3 1.8965 0.0662 
Age 0.1370 ** 0.0055 
Size 1.4740 *** 0.0209 
GO 1.6291 *** -0.0002 
R2 62,18% *** 7,90% *** 
Log Likelihood -3395.85 -938.79 
*, **, *** Significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively 
Table 6: Ordinary Least Squares regressions of ROA and Tobin’s Q and ownership 
structure  
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Using the ratio ROA we have a model which explains 62.18 (R2) of the firms’ 
performance. Unlike most previous studies, we fail to confirm the influence of 
ownership structure on ROA, suggesting that the firms’ performance is not affected by 
the level of ownership concentration, as we expected. This idea confirms that the 
ownership structure remains stable over the years and the shareholders do not change it 
to achieve higher performance (Zhou, 2001). Moreover, the variables firm’s age, size 
and growth opportunities have a significant and positive influence on the performance, 
while other variables not included in the model have a negative influence at a 5 percent 
of significant level. Since the firm can gain from economies of scale and knowledge, 
age and size are positively related with performance. Moreover, a company with growth 
opportunities has many investment opportunities that lead to higher performance. 
Finally, other variables as the macroeconomic scenario, legal environment and culture 
can also influence the performance. 
 
Once again we confirm that the Tobin’s Q ratio is not a good estimator of the firm’s 
performance because only 7.90 percent of the explanatory variables selected explain the 
performance. 
  
Again, to validate the consistency of our model, we analyze the normality, the 
homecedasticity and the inexistence of the residuals autocorrelation, and the presence of 
multicolinearity. We fail to validate the residuals normality hypothesis, but as our 
sample is high enough, this problem is not significant. Moreover, we detect problems of 
heteroscedasticity, but we solve them using the option heteroscedasticity consistent 
coefficient covariance – White. Finally, we do not find problems of multicollinearity 
nor of autocorrelation. 
 
5.2.3. Industry Effect 
To verify if there exist industry effects on the firm’s performance, we analyse the data 
from each one of the 12 industry: basic materials, capital goods, conglomerates, 
consumer cyclical, consumer non cyclical, energy, financial, healthcare, services, 
technology, transportation and utilities.  
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Number medium of 
Companies 
Percentage of the 
Sample 
Basic Materials 79 9,34% 
Capital Goods 123 14,54% 
Conglomerates 13 1,54% 
Consumer Cyclical 70 8,27% 
Consumer Non Cyclical 58 6,86% 
Energy 8 0,95% 
Financial 82 9,69% 
Healthcare 41 4,85% 
Services 175 20,69% 
Technology 158 18,68% 
Transportation 20 2,36% 
Utilities 19 2,25% 
Table 7: Structure of the Sample by Industry 
 
The results of estimating the equation 1 to each industry are available in table 8. 
 
Basic 
Materials 
Capital 
Goods 
Conglom. 
Consumer 
Cyclical 
Consumer 
Non Cyclical 
Energy 
C -1.3722 0.8212 -9.9886 -0.3128 0.7436 -6.7160 
IO 22.5283 *** 4.1194 ** 5.1498 2.1787 17.0169 ** 539.6060 ** 
IO2 -33.0832 **    -22.1799 ** -860.7999 ** 
Age -0.0756 ** -0.0114 -0.0344 -0.1155 -0.0775 -0.3374 * 
Size 0.5067 0.4024 0.6978 0.6938 * 0.6109 0.8627 * 
GO 6.2653 *** 0.3308 *** 3.4297 0.5868 *** 1.7123 *** 48.0137 ** 
Debt -0.0510 ** -0.0698 ** 0.0753 -0.1220 ** -0.1614 *** -0.1405 * 
R2 32.44% *** 18.29% *** 19.41% 27.18% *** 99.54% *** 99.98% ** 
Log 
Likelihood 
-204.13 -363.61 -30.09 -218.85 -166.68 8.23 
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*, **, *** Significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively 
Table 8: Ordinary Least Squares regressions of ROA and insider ownership by industry 
 
Table 8 reports the results of the Ordinary Least Squares regression of ROA and insider 
ownership by industry. As we expected, there are significant differences among 
industries. To some industries we confirm that insider ownership affects positively the 
performance, to others we find a quadratic relationship, while to others we fail to find 
any relationship. Finally we confirm our hypothesis number 3, which says that the 
industry influences the relationship analysed.  
 
The model used to the industry Basic Materials explains 32.44 percent of the firm’s 
performance. Contrary to the whole group we find a quadratic relationship between 
insider ownership and performance, meaning that the performance increases until the 
manager owns 34.05 percent of the firm’s shares, confirming the alignment effect, and 
after that level the performance decreases due to the entrenchment effect. Managers can 
create a board difficult to monitor, appropriate a part of the profits and stay in the job 
even if they are not competent for doing it. Moreover, we do not find any relationship at 
higher levels of insider ownership, which means that as the shares are concentrated in 
the hands of manager, he may satisfy his self interest, at the expense of the firm’s 
wealth. The variables age and growth opportunities positively affect the firm’s 
performance, while debt intensity and age have a negative influence, to a 5 percent level 
of significance. The model faces some problems of normality of the residuals, but as we 
 Financial Healthcare Services Technology Transport. Utilities 
C 0.5620 -43.5735 *** -19.9399 ** -48.7091 *** 12.0736 1.0076 
IO -2.4130 4.1883 11.8589 ** 18.2274 ** 2.2889 -23108.44 *** 
Age -0.0413 0.1500 0.2804 0.4862 0.0669 -0.0691 
Size 0.1414 2.8332 ** 1.1481 3.8809 *** -0.8638 0.4677 * 
GO 0.7792 *** -1.9214 0.0975 -5.1798 ** -1.7997 -7.5000 ** 
Debt -0.0023 0.2773 * 0.1006 -0.0536 0.0572 -0.0384 
R2 17.45% ** 45.23% *** 7.42% ** 19.58% *** 16.87% 79.73% *** 
Log 
Likelihood 
-275.04 -156.01 -750.12 -664.18 -56.26 -29.812 
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have 79 observations this problem is not significant. Additionally, the model does not 
face problems of heterocedasticity nor of autocorrelation. A similar conclusion is 
obtained when we analyse the relationship between insider ownership and firm 
performance to the industry Consumer Non Cyclical. The performance increases as the 
shares in the hands of manager increases till 38.36 percent, and decreases after that 
level. This model explains 99.54 percent of the performance. Additionally, the variable 
growth opportunities has a positive influence on the firm’s performance and debt 
intensity has a negative influence, to 1 percent of level of significance. Finally, for the 
Energy industry we find the same quadratic relationship, with a maximum of 31.34 
percent. However, as we only have 8 observations, this model suffers problems of 
normality, which means that all the conclusions can be spurious. To the industries 
Capital Goods, Services and Technology, we confirm a positive relationship between 
insider ownership and performance, as we found in subsection 5.2.1. The model used to 
Capital Goods explains 18.29 percent of the performance measured by ROA. Moreover, 
growth opportunities and debt intensity also influence performance in a positive and 
negative way, respectively, to a level of significance of 5 percent. To Services, after we 
solve the problem of heterocedasticity, and as the problem of normality is not very 
important since we have 81 observations, we find that the model used explains 7.43 
percent of the performance. However, other variables not included in the model can 
also be helpful to explain the firm’s performance. Lastly, to Technology industry, the 
model used describes 19.58 percent of performance. The variables size and growth 
opportunities also influence performance in a positive way, while there may exist other 
variables not included in the model which may explain it in a negative way. To Utilities 
industry, the performance is negatively influenced by insider ownership. However, this 
conclusion may not be correct since the model, which has 19 observations, suffers from 
problems of the normality of the residuals. To the other industries, namely 
Conglomerate, Consumer Cyclical, Financial, Healthcare and Transportation we did not 
find a conclusion of the relationship between performance and insider ownership 
because or the model is not significant to explain that relationship or there are problems 
of the normality of the residuals. 
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Basic 
Materials 
Capital 
Goods 
Conglom. 
Consumer 
Cyclical 
Consumer 
Non Cyclical 
Energy 
C -3.3618 1.3045 -31.3768 * -2.4408 -1.9902 15.7323 
S3 14.8007 *** 0.8743 -30.6742 * 15.7896 ** 12.9165 * 6.2341 
S32 -13.6313 ***  58.0407 ** -18.5835 ** -13.6239 *  
Age -0.0734 ** -0.0289 0.1501 -0.1068 -0.0693 0.68865 
Size 0.4918 0.3999 1.9388 * 0.7754 * 0.7044 * -1.0995 
GO 6.2902 *** 0.3287 * -45.3408 0.6162 *** 1.7189 *** -15.6499 
Debt -0.0422 * -0.0746 ** 0.2331 * -0.1279 *** -0.1430 *** 0.18350 
R2 33.82% *** 15.23% *** 68.63% 32.03% *** 99.54% *** 48.06% 
Log 
Likelihood 
-203.31 -365.88 -23.96 -216.44 -166.92 -22.51 
 
 Financial Healthcare Services Technology Transport. Utilities 
C -0.2765 -43.0064 ** -16.3702 * -46.9245 *** 19.8058 ** -4.4697 
S3 0.5941 3.4473 -0.4085 -1.5162 -6.5584 2.0685 
Age -0.0389 0.1466 0.2949 0.3539 -0.0194 -0.0138 
Size 0.1588 2.6899 ** 1.0979 4.0130 *** -1.1447 0.6697 
GO 0.7636 *** -1.8369 -0.1665 -5.0908 ** -2.2579 -8.8071 
Debt 0.0036 0.3021 ** 0.0782 -0.0697 0.0725 -0.0063 
R2 17.27% ** 45.22% *** 4.87% 16.07% *** 23.59% 25.47% 
Log 
Likelihood 
-275.13 -156.01 -752.48 -667.56 -55.42 -42.19 
*, **, *** Significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively 
Table 9: Ordinary Least Squares regressions of ROA and ownership structure  
 
According to the relationship between performance and ownership structure we also 
find different conclusions depending on the industry analysed. The model used to the 
industry Basic Materials explains 33.82 percent of the firm’s performance. We find that 
performance increases as the shares concentrated in the hands of one individual or 
institution is equal to 54.29 percent, confirming the monitoring effect, and decreases 
after that level due to the expropriation effect, it means, dominant shareholders try to 
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expropriate minorities’ wealth. The variables age and growth opportunities are 
positively related to performance, while debt intensity has a negative influence. To the 
industries Consumer Cyclical and to Consumer Non Cyclical we also find a quadratic 
relationship between performance and ownership structure, and the model explains 
32.03 and 99.54 percent, respectively, of the performance. Moreover, we find a 
maximum when ownership is concentrated at 42.48 and 47.40 percent. The variables 
size and growth opportunities also influence the performance, while debt intensity has a 
negative influence. To Conglomerates industry the model used is not significant and 
consequently we can not take any conclusion. Finally, to the others industries, namely 
Capital Goods, Energy, Financial, Healthcare, Services, Technology, Transportation 
and Utilities we fail to find a relationship between firm performance and ownership 
structure. 
 
5.2.4. Country Effect 
In our analysis we include 9 Continental European countries: Austria, Belgium, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Spain and Portugal. Each nation has its own 
characteristics, legal environment and macroeconomics scenario. Likewise, to verify our 
hypothesis 4, we test equations 1 and 2 by country.  
 
 Austria Belgium Finland France Germany 
C 0.3488 17.1152 ** -10.3182 -18.6217 -33.4999 *** 
IO 7.7939 ** 86.4750 ** 13.2796 ** 10.7975 9.3216 ** 
IO2  -158.3868 ***    
Age 0.2116 ** -0.0301  0.1177 0.05593 0.2785 ** 
Size 0.0843 -0.7753 1.1598 * 1.4575 2.2442 *** 
GO 0.3364 *** 8.1459 -1.3153 2.4365 1.2861 ** 
Debt  -0.1104 **    
R2 57.11% *** 74.06% * 10.73% * 9.98% 14.52% *** 
Log 
Likelihood 
-90.00 -27.44 -309.93 -153.38 -1366.57 
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Greece Italy Spain Portugal 
C -0.9366 -17.8335 *** 1.2296 -14.3255 
IO 3.0869 * 11.2801 *** 16.0899 ** 2.9480 
IO2   -19.6575 **  
Age -0.2914 *** 0.0974 0.0488 0.4633 
Size 0.8080 *** 1.0885 ** 0.1842 1.2349 
GO 1.7062 *** 0.5832 ** 9.5553 *** -7.3563 
Debt -0.1132 *** 0.0537 -0.0483 -0.1215 
R2 99.25% *** 15.43% *** 39.97% *** 14.56% 
Log 
Likelihood 
-285.36 -512.79 -234.52 -114.10 
*, **, *** Significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively 
Table 10: Ordinary Least Squares regressions of ROA and insider ownership by country 
 
In fact, analysing the relationship between insider ownership and performance of each 
country in separate we find country-effects, confirming our hypothesis number 4.  
 
In Belgium, we find a non-linear relationship between insider ownership and firm 
performance: the performance increases until the manager owns 27.30 percent of the 
firm’s shares, due to the alignment effect between managers and owners’ interests, and 
decreases after that level, confirming the entrenchment effect. We fail to confirm the 
alignment effect at higher levels of insider ownership. Debt intensity is negatively 
related to performance at the 5% level of significance. Finally, there are other variables 
not included in the model that positively influence the performance. The model 
described explains 74.06 percent of the performance and does not face any problem of 
multicollinearity, heteroscedasticity, normality and autocorrelation of the residuals. In 
Spain, we also find a quadratic relationship between performance and insider 
ownership, meaning that performance increases till insider ownership reaches 40.93 
percent and decreases after that, confirming both the alignment and the entrenchment 
effect. Additionally, growth opportunities is also positively related to performance. The 
model, which explains 39.97 percent of the performance, faces some problems of 
64 
heteroscedasticity, that were solved using the White proceed, and problems of 
normality, but as the sample has 82 observations this problem is not so evident. 99.25 
percent of the firm’s performance is explained by the model applied to Greece. Insider 
ownership affects positively and to a level of 10 percent of significance the 
performance, confirming the alignment effect. Additionally, size and growth 
opportunities are also positively related to performance, while age and debt intensity 
influences it negatively. We reject the residuals normality hypothesis, but as the model 
has 101 observations, this problem is not so significant. In Finland we find a positive 
relationship between performance and insider ownership and size, at the 5 percent level 
of significance. However, the model is not significant, since R2 is 5.66 percent and the 
results find can be spurious because we find problems of normality of the residuals. In 
Germany, we fixed all problems of heteroscedasticity and normality of the residuals, 
and found that the model explains 14.52 percent of performance. There is a positive and 
significant relationship between performance and insider ownership at the 5 percent of 
level of significance, confirming the alignment effect. Moreover, age, size and growth 
opportunities also contribute positively to explain performance, while there are other 
variables, not used in the model, which negatively explain it. In Italy we discover a 
positive relationship between insider ownership and ROA, but the model applied only 
explains 15.43 percent of performance. Moreover, size and growth opportunities also 
have a positive influence on performance, while there may exist other variables 
different from the ones used in the model, with a negative relationship. All problems of 
normality and heteroscedasticity were solved. In Austria, we also find a positive 
relationship between performance and insider ownership, at the 5 percent level of 
signification. Moreover, age and growth opportunities also have a positive relation with 
performance. However, the model, which explains 57.11 percent of performance, may 
be inconsistent since we reject the normality of the residuals, it means, the coefficient 
estimates could be wrong. Finally, we do not find any consistent conclusion in France 
and Portugal, may be due to the fewer data to this countries. Moreover, we find 
divergence among the probability of the t-statistic and the F-statistic, which shows 
problems of normality of the residuals. 
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Austria Belgium Finland France Germany 
C -1.8678 8.6877 -5.1406 -14.8124 
-32.9656 
*** 
S3 4.3479 * 5.6846 -3.0832 1.9306 1.3528 
Age 0.1572 ** -0.0197 0.1229 0.1348 0.2452 ** 
Size 0.1924 -0.3483 0.8393 1.2023 2.2449 *** 
GO 0.3705 *** -5.3704 -1.1975 3.2139 1.2346 ** 
Debt -0.0124  0.0232 -0.0377 0.0898 * 
R2 57.77% *** 21.09% 6.10% 6.81% 13.29% *** 
Log 
Likelihood 
-89.73 -35.23 -312.09 -154.06 -1368.9 
 
 
*, **, *** Significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively 
Table 11: Ordinary Least Squares regressions of ROA and ownership structure by 
country 
 
Analysing the effect of the ownership structure on performance by countries we find 
many divergences. In Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece and Portugal there is 
no evidence that ownership structure influences performance. Moreover, the model used 
in Belgium, Finland, France and Portugal is not a good model as there are other 
variables which together can explain performance. Nevertheless, the model applied to 
 
 
Greece Italy Spain Portugal 
C -0.3716 -23.5119 *** 3.7399 -15.622 
S3 0.7126 13.7699 *** -0.5649 1.3948 
Age -0.3014 *** 0.0497 0.0321 0.4753 
Size 0.7898 ** 1.1722 *** 0.0858 1.2613 
GO 1.7094 *** 0.5162 *** 9.3111 *** -7.8753 
Debt -0.1124 *** 0.0579 -0.0483 -0.1071 
R2 99.23% *** 15.30% *** 35.26% *** 14.18% 
Log 
Likelihood 
-286.75 -512.90 -237.6157 -114.1747 
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Austria explains 57.70 percent of performance. We find that the ownership structure 
positively influences performance, confirming the monitoring effect: as the ownership 
structure is more concentrated performance increases because the firm’s owner may try 
to pass the firm onto the next generations, which leads to a long term view and a better 
performance. Moreover, age and growth opportunities are also positively related to 
performance. Finally, the model used to explain performance of Italian firms, could 
explain 15.30 percent. Ownership concentration and performance are positively related, 
confirming the monitoring effect. Additionally, growth opportunities has a positive 
influence on performance.  
 
5.2.5. Endogeneity 
Finally, to test our last hypothesis we apply the Two-Stage Least Square model (2SLS) 
in order to verify if the dependent variable ROA is correlated with the independent 
variable ownership structure. Moreover, with this model we can observe if there is more 
than one dependent variable. 
 
In fact, analyzing the subsection 5.2.2 we find that the ownership structure does not 
influence performance, but is the contrary true? Testing the equations 3 and 4 
simultaneously we obtain the following results: 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*, **, *** Significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively 
Table 12: Two Stage Least Squares regressions of ROA and ownership structure 
 
 
3S 
Instrument list: ROA, 3S, 
age, size, GO, debt 
C 0.5333 *** 
ROA 0.0010 
Age 0.0047 *** 
Size -0.0105 ** 
GO -0.0002 
Debt -0.0006 
R2 1.89% *** 
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Analyzing table 12 we find that the variable three major shareholders is not explained 
by the performance measured by ROA. Likewise we confirm our hypothesis 5 that say 
that ownership structure is an exogenous variable. This means that the results found 
before are robust. 
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6. DISCUSSION 
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6.1. Insider Ownership and Performance 
We examined the influence of insider ownership on firm performance in 9 Continental 
European countries: Portugal, Spain, France, Belgium, Germany, Italy, Greece, Austria 
and Finland. Controlling the variables age, size, growth opportunities and debt intensity 
we found evidence of a positive relationship. It means that manager ownership of the 
firms’ shares is positively related to the performance, because the interests of managers 
and owners are aligned. Moreover, the firm’s owner-manager is concerned with the 
firm’s long term survival, and consequently he invests in high quality projects in order 
to increase his own and the firm’s wealth. Likewise we can conclude that a contract 
manager, even if he has more knowledge about the market and the job, is expensive to 
the firm, due to the total cost of his compensation package and the negative impact of 
objectives divergence – leading to suboptimal strategies and monitoring costs. 
 
Furthermore, country effects exist in the insider ownership-firm performance 
relationship. In Germany, Italy, Greece, Austria and Finland we confirm the positive 
relationship between insider ownership and performance. However, we found a 
quadratic relationship in Belgium and Spain, implying that performance increases till 
managers own 27.30 and 40.93 percent, respectively, of the firm’ shares and it 
decreases after that level, confirming the alignment and the entrenchment effect. Up to 
those levels of management ownership, the interests of managers and owners are 
aligned. However, after a certain level managers may create a board difficult to monitor 
or can appropriate a part of the profits, reinforcing the entrenchment effect. 
Furthermore, we failed to confirm the alignment effect at higher levels of insider 
ownership, may be because at higher levels of ownership, managers may try to satisfy 
their own interests at the expense of firm’s value maximization. Finally, in Portugal and 
France we have not been able to identify a consistent relation due to the insufficiency of 
available data. 
 
We verified that insider ownership leads to higher performance, especially because it 
influences the strategic behavior and consequently the performance of the firm. 
However, we did not confirm the cubic relationship observed in other studies. This 
difference is significant as the dominant fields of observation have been the US and the 
UK: The so called Anglo Saxon nations tend to have more developed capital markets as 
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well as cultural and legal environments that markedly diverge from the Continental 
European nations covered in this study. In the U.S. and the U.K. the ownership structure 
is normally dispersed, and consequently the firm’s manager is a professional hired for 
the job and not one of the firm’s owners, in contrast with the countries included in our 
sample were the ownership structure is normally concentrated and the manager is the 
firm’s owner or a highly monitored professional specifically contracted for the job. 
Likewise, the power and influence of professional managers used to be higher in the 
U.S. and U.K. enabling them to create a board difficult to monitor, raising the potential 
for profits appropriation and job entrenchement. Our findings suggest that the 
organizational mode predominant in Continental Europe is efficient, as insider 
ownership unambiguously leads to higher performance.  
There are some specificities, though. Belgium and Spain differ from other Continental 
European nations suggesting the existence of different agency costs and specific 
institutional characteristics. The manager may have some liberty to take actions and 
likewise we confirm two effects: the alignment and the entrenchment effect. 
Nevertheless, we did not find a cubic relationship between managerial ownership and 
firm performance in Spain as Miguel et al. (2004) did. This can be due to the different 
variable used to measure the performance because we use an accounting measure, ROA, 
while Miguel et al. used a market measure, Tobin’s Q. Moreover, the databases used 
were also different, which can also influence the results. 
 
Finally, we verified that industry also affects the relationship between insider ownership 
and firm performance. Only in Capital Goods, Services and Technology we confirmed a 
positive relationship between insider ownership and performance, suggesting that in 
these industries management ownership leads to higher performance confirming the 
importance of the alignment effect. The firm’s manager is often its owner as well. If he 
is a professional contracted for the job, the firm’s owner may try to monitor him in 
order to guarantee the pursuit of value maximizing strategies. However, in other 
industries we found confirmation of a quadratic relationship. This effect is present in 
Basic Materials and Consumer Non Cyclical industries, suggesting a more specific 
culture in these industries that enables managers to make more independent decisions. 
The performance increases till managers reach 34.05 and 38.36 percent ownership, 
respectively, of the firms’ shares, and decreases after that level because as insider 
ownership increases, the manager may try to satisfy his self-interest rather than 
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maximizing the value of the firm. To conclude, in the remaining industries under 
scrutiny, namely Financial, Conglomerate, Consumer Cyclical, Healthcare and 
Transportation, we have insufficient data to generate conclusive results. The different 
results obtained suggest that different industries face different environmental and 
structural differences including concentration, research and development, 
competitiveness, maturity, growth opportunities, financial pressure and others. 
 
 
6.2. Ownership Structure and Performance 
We also examined empirically the relationship between the ownership structure and the 
performance using a panel data of 853 Continental European firms over 2000-2004, 
from an agency costs perspective. Contrary to our expectations, we could not find a 
significant relationship between performance and ownership structure, suggesting that 
concentration does not have a positive or negative impact on performance.  
 
We found that individuals do not choose the ownership structure that maximizes the 
firm’s performance, but rather that maximizes the relationship benefits-costs, according 
with their self strategy. Likewise, these results clearly contradict the findings of 
Demsetz and Lehn (1985), Cho (1998), Himmelberg et al. (1999), and Demsetz and 
Villalonga (2001), who concluded that ownership variables are endogenously 
determined in equilibrium by changes in ownership structure in ways consistent with 
the firm’s performance maximization. Using a Two-Stage Least Squares model we also 
confirmed that our results are not spurious, it means, the performance does not influence 
the ownership structure neither the contrary. Moreover, there may exist other variables 
that influence the firm’s performance, such as the firm’s age, size and growth 
opportunities. These results are in accordance to Zhou (2001), who concludes that 
ownership structure remains stable over the years as investors avoid frequent ownership 
structure changes, due to the adaptation and coordination costs. 
 
We have also analyzed the country effect on the relationship between performance and 
ownership structure. In most nations: Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Portugal and Spain the model used was not significant, as we did not found any 
influence of ownership structure on the performance. Though we know that most the 
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firms in these countries have concentrated ownership, and minority investors are 
scarcely protected by law, they may exercise an active role in the firm, taking decisions 
and collaborating on the firm’s strategy in order to avoid expropriation by majority 
investors. However, in Austria and Italy we discovered a different influence: 
performance increases as the shares are more concentrated, confirming the monitoring 
effect. In this case, the dominant shareholder may try to maximize the firm’s wealth 
since it leads to an increase in his own wealth. These results may reflect country specific 
culture, institutional characteristics and legal framework.  
 
Our results differ from those obtained by Thomsen and Pedersen (2000), who also study 
the relationship between ownership structure and performance in European countries. 
They found a quadratic relationship showing that performance increases as ownership 
structure is more concentrated, till a maximum is reached, and decreases to higher levels 
of concentration, due to minority’s expropriation. These differences in results may 
depend on the sample, especially because we used a different database and can also be 
influenced by the model described to confirm the relationship between ownership 
structure and firm performance. Moreover, the results are also different when we 
compare with those obtained for the U.S. and the U.K.. However, in these cases we 
have a different predominant type of ownership structure because in the U.S. and the 
U.K. the majority of the firms have dispersed ownership while in Continental Europe 
the majority of the firms have concentrated capital. However, this is a common pattern 
of previous studies, as some researchers obtained a positive and linear relationship 
(Wruck, 1988, Morck et al., 2000, Gedajlovic and Shapiro, 2002 and Eisenberg et al., 
1998), a second group found a negative and linear relationship (Leech and Leahy, 1998, 
Mudambi and Nicosia, 1998), a third obtained a quadratic relationship (Gedajlovic and 
Shapiro, 1998, Thomsen and Pedersen, 2000, Claessens et al., 2002, and Miguel et al., 
2004) and some could not find any significant relationship. 
 
Finally, we document differences in industries when analyzing the relationship between 
ownership structure and firm performance by industry. In most industries we fail to find 
any influence, as we have already documented. However, in Basic Materials, Consumer 
Cyclical and Consumer Non Cyclical we found a quadratic relationship, showing that 
performance increases as ownership structure reaches 54.29, 42.48, and 47.40 percent, 
respectively, of concentration, and decreases after those levels, suggesting a problem of 
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minorities’ wealth expropriation. These differences in results may result from the sector 
influence, namely in regard to culture, financial pressure competition and growth 
opportunities. 
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7. CONCLUSION 
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7.1. Main Results 
We analyzed the impact of insider ownership and ownership structure on performance.  
 
Our results show that insider ownership influences positively the firm performance, 
possibly due to a more efficient alignment. As the share of capital owned by the 
manager increases, he may be more concerned with the firm’s wealth and interests 
leading to a higher performance. The eventual family links and networking may also 
facilitate deals and enhance the firm’s value. Hence, the owner-manager has a better 
performance than a professional manager, not only because the interests of the manager 
and owner are aligned but also because they make an effort to pass the firm onto the 
next generation. Less pressure for exhibiting short term profits which plague the 
managers of listed companies, may lead to value creating strategies. These results are 
observed in most of the Continental European countries analysed. However, in France 
and Portugal we failed to find a clear picture, while in Belgium and Spain we 
discovered a quadratic relationship, indicating the presence of alignment and the 
entrenchment effect. We also confirm some industry effects, suggesting that different 
types of competition, market forces, growth opportunities, and other factors lead to 
different levels of performance.  
 
Additionally, we failed to find the impact of ownership structure on firm’s performance, 
showing that the level of ownership concentration does not influence corporate 
performance in European countries. Therefore we can not conclude that ownership 
concentration leads to better performance than dispersed ownership. Moreover, we 
confirmed that ownership is an exogenous variable, and does not depend on the firm’s 
performance as Demsetz and Lehn (1985), among others, found. Likewise, ownership 
remains relatively stable over time and does not change in order to achieve higher 
performance. Hence, we can not infer that ownership mitigates agency problems. To 
conclude, we found that country and industry play a role as the results are sensitive to 
the country and industry effects. 
 
7.2. Study’ limitations 
Owing to our data limitations we have ignored two of the six control variables: the 
capital intensity and R&D intensity, because we could only obtain these data for a 
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limited number of firms. Moreover, we also lost many observations because we used 2 
databases to construct our sample, and it was difficult to find sufficient information on 
ownership, attending to our financial data. Hence, we fail to have significant data from 
some countries and industries, which limits our conclusions. Finally we have not 
identified the major shareholder: the State, a family, foreign investors, financial 
institutions, individuals or other investors due to the difficulty of finding such 
information. 
 
7.3. Suggestions for further analysis 
In this section we outline the results of some of this further testing. First we can analyze 
in detail which reasons cause the industry-effect. We found that industry has a 
significant impact, possibly due to competition, market force, debt pressures and growth 
opportunities, among others. Nevertheless, further research is required to measure the 
impact of each of these items on performance. This topic is important especially to 
investors who know how to use these performance drivers to optimize their investments. 
It is also important to analyze whether ownership concentration is associated to family 
firms, because in our case the major shareholder can be another firm, the State, a 
financial institution or an individual. Due to identification problem we can not conclude 
that family firms perform better than non family firms, as Anderson and Reeb (2003) 
found, although there is evidence of a similar result. 
Finally, we also could not analyze if the return and risk of firms with ownership 
concentration are different from the ones obtained in firms with dispersed ownership. In 
fact the market for family firms is very illiquid, since there is a tendency to preserve 
ownership within the family. Therefore, few transactions made by minority investors, 
which leads the market to under-evaluate family firms. Consequently firms with 
ownership concentration may have lower return and risk (Burkart et al., 2003; Cubin 
and Leech, 1983). Additionally the small return expected for family firms may be due to 
the propensity of the major investors to be risk averse. Owners may prefer to take 
conservative strategic actions in order to pass the firm onto the next generations 
(Anderson and Reeb, 2003).  
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9.1. Synthesis of Previous Evidence 
 
UNITED 
STATES 
UNITED 
KINGDOM 
JAPAN SPAIN INDIA 
POSITIVE 
AND LINEAR 
RELATION 
Mehran (1995) - 
Morck et al. 
(2000) 
- - 
QUADRATIC 
RELATION 
Stulz (1988) 
Max: 40-50% 
 
McConnel and 
Servaes (1990) 
Max: 40-50% 
 
Han and Suk 
(1998) 
Max: 40-50% 
Mudambi and 
Nicosia (1998) 
Max: 11% 
- - 
Kumar 
(2003) 
Min: 24% 
 
CUBIC 
RELATION 
Morck et al. 
(1988) 
Max: 5% 
Min: 25% 
 
Cho (1998) 
Max: 7% 
Min: 38% 
 
Holderness et 
al. (1999) 
Max: 5% 
Min: 25% 
 
 
Short and 
Keasey (1999) 
Max: 12,99% 
Min: 41,99% 
 
Faccio and 
Lasfer (1999) 
Max: 19,68% 
Min: 54,12% 
- 
Miguel et 
al. (2004) 
Max: 35% 
Min: 70% 
 
- 
W-SHAPED 
RELATION 
Cui and Mak 
(2002) 
Min: 10%, 50% 
Max: 30% 
- - - - 
Table 13: Previous Evidence: Insider Ownership and Performance  
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UNITED 
STATES 
UNITED 
KINGDOM 
GERMANY JAPAN SPAIN EUROPE 
EAST 
ASIA 
FINLAND 
POSITIVE 
AND 
LINEAR 
RELATION 
Wruck 
(1988) 
 
- - 
Morck et 
al. (2000) 
 
Gedajlovic 
and 
Shapiro 
(2002) 
- - - 
Eisenberg 
et al. 
(1998) 
NEGATIVE 
AND 
LINEAR 
RELATION 
- 
Leech and 
Leahy 
(1998) 
 
Mudambi 
and 
Nicosia 
(1998) 
- - - - - - 
QUADRATIC 
RELATION 
Gedajlovic 
and Shapiro 
(1998) 
 
Anderson 
and Reeb 
(2003) 
- 
Gedajlovic 
and 
Shapiro 
(1998) 
- 
Miguel 
et al. 
(2004) 
Thomsen 
and 
Pedersen 
(2000) 
Claessens 
et al. 
(2002) 
- 
 Table 14: Previous Evidence: Ownership Structure and Performance   
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9.2. Variables Description 
 
DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
VARIABLES DEFINITION 
Q 
Tobin’s Q is measured by the ratio of the market to book value plus the 
debt by the total assets 
ROA Return on Assets 
Table 15: List of Dependent Variables  
(Source: DataStream) 
 
 
OWNERSHIP VARIABLES 
VARIABLES DEFINITION 
5S 
Large shareholder is measured as a proportion of shares held by the 
three largest shareholder 
IO 
Managerial ownership is measured as the percentage of ownership held 
by the President, Chief Executive Officer, Chairman and Vice-chairman 
of the board and Executive Director 
Table 16: List of Ownership Variables  
(Source: Reuters) 
 
 
CONTROL VARIABLES 
VARIABLES DEFINITION 
Size Firm size is measured by ln(Sale) 
Age Age is count from the start date of the company till the year in analysis 
GO Growth Opportunities is measured by year-over-year sales 
Debt Debt Intensity is measured by the ratio of the debt over the total assets 
CI Capital Intensity is measured by capital-to-sales ratio 
RDI R&D Intensity is measured by the ration of R&D expenditures to sales 
Risk Risk is measure by the sample risk measure 
Table 17: List of Control Variables 
(Source: DataStream) 
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9.3. A Structure of the Sample 
  
Number medium 
of Companies 
Percentage of 
the Sample 
Austria  35 4,10% 
Belgium  14 1,64% 
Finland  85 9,96% 
France  39 4,57% 
Greece  101 11,84% 
Germany  324 37,98% 
Italy  140 16,41% 
Spain  82 9,61% 
Portugal  33 3,87% 
Table 18: Structure of the Sample after outliers 
 
